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Iacobelli: Arbitrary Justice?

Arbitrary Justice?

A Comparative Analysis of Canadian
Death Sentences Passed and
Commuted during the First World War
Teresa Iacobelli

T

he topic of military executions has
dominated the study of discipline and
punishment during the First World War.
Considering the relatively small numbers of
men who were executed, 361 in British and
Dominion forces combined, it is startling how
much attention the subject has garnered.1 The
morality of the practice been widely discussed
and debated and it has spawned recent pardons
campaigns in the United Kingdom, New Zealand
and Canada. Yet, virtually ignored in these
debates have been the stories of the 3,080 men
of the British and Dominion forces who were
also sentenced to death, but saw their sentences
commuted. What was the fate of these men and
what accounts for their salvation when the luck
of others had run out?

that the timing of a particular offence, the
disciplinary state of an accused soldier’s battalion
and the opinions of divisional commanders
were the most important influences acting upon
the final decision of a military court martial.
However, where an individual soldier’s personal
disciplinary record was taken into account, the
decisions of the courts-martial appear, more
often than not, to have been quite random and
arbitrary.

The Courts-Martial Process

T

The main focus of this article is a comparison
between those death sentences confirmed and
those commuted. The topic has been solely
researched within a Canadian context in which
222 death sentences were passed during the
course of the war, and 25 Canadians actually
faced the firing squad. Similar to the British
statistics as a whole, 89 per cent of all Canadian
death sentences were commuted in the First
World War.2

o our modern mindset, the practice of a
military killing its own volunteers is a
difficult one to comprehend, yet from 1914 to
1918, military executions were seen both as an
effective punishment, and as a necessary tool
in the maintenance of morale. It is within the
context of those times which one needs to analyse
the practice of military executions. In Canada
in 1914 the death penalty was both accepted by
and practiced in civilian society, and in the case
of the military death penalty, examination of
Parliamentary Debates from 1914 to 1921 gives
no suggestion that there was any controversy
over its use.

For the purpose of this article, the courts-martial
and personnel records of 50 Canadian soldiers
have been studied. An attempt has been made
to find patterns and consistencies to explain
why some death sentences were confirmed when
others were not. Preliminary findings suggest

In 1914 the death penalty was applicable to a
number of crimes listed in the Army Act.3 This
study is concerned solely with its application to
the crimes of desertion and cowardice. Defined
by the Manual of Military Law of 1914, desertion
“implies an intention on the part of the offender
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either not to return to His Majesty’s service at all,
or to escape some particular important service…”4
Therefore, intent is the most important feature
and distinguishes desertion from the lesser
charge of absence without leave (AWL). Cowardice
was a much more subjective charge and therefore
harder to prove. Cowardice could be linked to
disobedience or refusal to obey orders, however,
it differed from these lesser charges in that the
offence had to occur before the enemy or in the
presence of danger.5
There were four types of courts martial:
regimental, district, general and field general.
Regimental and district courts-martial dealt with
minor crimes, while general and field general
were reserved for serious offences which could
potentially result in a punishment of death. The
cases researched for this study deal exclusively
with field general courts-martial (FGCM). FGCMs
differed from general courts-martial in that
they were held in the field and in the interest of
expediency were simplified in both procedure
and requirements. Throughout the course of the
First World War FGCMs were far more common
than general courts-martial.
In order to convene a court martial with full
punitive authority, no less than three officers
were required to be in attendance. In the case
of passing a sentence of death it was required
that all members of the court martial be in
agreement. The final decision in any death
sentence rested upon the Commander-in-Chief.
On the Western Front, where 90 percent of British
death sentences were passed, Field Marshal Sir
John French was Commander-in-Chief from
August 1914 until the end of 1915; thereafter,
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig assumed the
appointment. The fact that Haig confirmed the
bulk the executions (253 death sentences were
confirmed by Haig) has only fueled the popular
representation of him as an uncaring and
ruthless leader, the so-called “Butcher of the
Somme.” Yet, according to some historians, the
very fact that 90 percent of the death sentences
passed were eventually commuted does much to
dispute this description.6
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of
the British Commonwealth forces, is often referred to as
“The Butcher of the Somme.” He was the man responsible
for confirming the majority of death sentences during the
First World War. However, the fact that 90 percent of death
sentences were overturned puts Haig in a different light.
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By 1915 all capital cases required a plea of “not
guilty” to insure that evidence would be heard.
Perpetrators were offered the assistance of a
“prisoner’s friend” who was an officer who usually
had little knowledge of military law or procedure,
but was assigned to act in the role of defense
counsel. The army did not take full advantage of
trained lawyers who served among the ranks.7
For those punishments handed down by the
FGCMs there were some guidelines, but only
regarding maximum punishments, which were to
be imposed for the worst offences and to habitual
offenders. In the cases of commuted sentences,
alternative punishments were commonly military
imprisonments, which could be served with or
without hard labour, and penal servitude. The
sentences in the cases studied range anywhere
from two to 15 years and further research has
turned up no formal guidelines informing these
sentences. By all accounts the punishments in the
commuted cases appear to have been somewhat
random and dependent upon the sentencing
officer.
The power of commutation was further
reinforced in 1915 with the Suspension of
Sentences Act. According to a 1918 report by
the Ministry of Overseas Forces in Canada, the
Act was meant to “give men who had committed
serious military offences, because of exhaustion,
or their loss of courage or for other reasons,
a chance to save their reputation and to win a
remission of their sentences.”8 More than an act
of mercy towards soldiers, the Suspension of
Sentences Act also prevented the overcrowding of
military prisons and balanced the military’s two
strongest needs– firm discipline and an ample
supply of men for the front lines.

The Evidence

A

mong the 50 cases examined in this study
are all 25 members of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF) who were executed,
as well as 25 men who were sentenced to death,
but later had their sentences reprieved. The 25
commuted cases were chosen to correspond
with the confirmed cases. For example, if there
was an individual sentenced and executed in
1917, a death sentence which was passed and
commuted in 1917 was also selected. Wherever
possible there was also an attempt to match the

dates by month as well. The cases were also
chosen by offence. Therefore, for every individual
executed for desertion, there is an individual
who had their death sentence commuted for the
same offence. However, because two of the 25
men were executed for murder and there was
no possibility of commutation in such cases,
two more commuted cases of desertion were
chosen in their stead. The 50 cases represent
an array of Canadian battalions and span from
1916, the year of the first execution, to 1918. One
soldier executed was a company quartermaster
sergeant, serving as platoon sergeant at the time
of his offence; all of the others were privates. All
incidents studied occurred on the Western Front.9
The information for each individual comes from
courts-martial records and military personnel
files. The documents contained within the courtsmartial records were not uniform. In the cases of
the executed men transcripts of courts-martial
do not exist. It is unknown what has become
of these records and one can only assume that
the records have been lost or destroyed. In
addition, because courts-martial were held in
the field and in a hurried manner, there was
likely very little documentation to begin with as
record keeping was not a priority. This lack of
evidence is perhaps revealing of the nature of
the courts-martial process. Most useful for the
present paper were Field Service Records, letters
from officers to divisional headquarters, and in
some cases, personal letters from relatives of
the deceased which were included in the files.
Among the commuted cases, courts-martial files
were more complete, containing such crucial
documents as schedules listing both charges and
pleas, summaries of evidence including witness
testimony, and most telling of all, statements of
superior officers regarding the character of the
accused, the state of discipline in the battalion
and recommendations for punishment. Again,
the files were not standardized, but on the whole
these records were in much better condition than
the records of those men executed.
In the case of military personnel files, the
information was much more uniform. Among
the most important documents were statements
of attestation which were helpful in constructing
personal backgrounds; medical records which
detailed any injuries and illnesses; and finally,
reports listing all military offences and their
25
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corresponding punishments. The combination
of all of these documents allowed the assembly
of a more complete picture of the individuals
investigated, both from a personal and from a
disciplinary perspective.

Factors Affecting Courts-Martial
Disciplinary Records

P

opular perception would assume that as in
civilian law, an individual soldier’s past
disciplinary record would be one of the most
important factors in sentencing, and, therefore,
one of the most accurate predictors in the
decision of a military court martial. Based on
this, one might assume that the records of the
25 Canadians executed were among some of
the worst in the CEF, giving the members of the
courts-martial little reason to exercise mercy,
while, conversely, first time offenders would be
spared the ultimate penalty. Many of the cases
did conform to these general rules. For example,
Private James Wilson had four AWL charges and
had been the subject of numerous FGCMs before
he was eventually shot for desertion. Out of the
23 men executed for desertion or cowardice, 18
had previous records that had included charges
for either desertion or absence without leave,
or in some cases both. Furthermore, seven of
these individuals had been previously courtsmartialed, including Privates Charles Welsh,
Stephen Fowles and Norman Ling, who had all
been reprieved from earlier death sentences.
Conforming to what may have been expected
among the commuted cases of death, 12 of the
25 men were first time offenders.
Yet, a significant number of men seemed to
have been sentenced in contradiction to the
military’s own standards. Five men with clean
records were shot by order of a court martial.
Included in this group is Platoon Sergeant
William Alexander, who had an exemplerary
disciplinary and service record prior to his crime
and execution. While men such as Alexander
suffered due to the inconsistencies in the court
martial system, others seem to have benefitted

Major-General Arthur Currie, commander of 1st Canadian
Division, believed that the death sentence was warranted
in some cases, especially for repeat offenders, but his
sanction did not always result in the execution being
carried out.
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T.L. Tremblay, commanding officer of the 22nd
Battalion, substantiates this claim. In April 1917
Tremblay wrote:

from them. Private Matthew Latto was a longtime disciplinary problem for the Canadian
Corps. Before his desertion conviction and
death sentence in January 1916, Latto had
seven previous disciplinary incidences which
had included ten different charges, including
four for absence without leave. Recommending
that Latto’s sentence of death be carried out,
Major-General A.W. Currie, commander of 1st
Canadian Division, wrote of Latto’s record on
21 January 1916:

There seems to be an impression among many
of the men of my Battalion, that by committing
the offence of desertion, they will be awarded
a term of imprisonment, which will prevent
them from serving in the trenches, and that the
Canadian Authorities will arrange for sentences
to be remitted after the war. I am of the opinion
that in previous cases in which my men have
been tried by F.G.C.M. and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment, it has not had a beneficial effect
on my Battalion.12

This man has previously been tried and found
guilty of a similar offence. He has further been
guilty on several occasions of absence and also
of insubordination. He has been sentenced to
18 months of I.H.L. (commuted to 6 mos.); to
2 years’ I.H.L. and to 5 years’ Penal Servitude
without effect.10

However, this reasoning is problematic. While
it is true that deserters would have likely been
aware of the low rates of confirmation of death
sentences, they would have been equally aware of
the extremely high rates of suspended sentences
which quickly sent men back into the front lines.
Out of the 25 commuted cases examined, 22
prison sentences were suspended and the men
returned to front line duties. Therefore, if it were
the ultimate goal of some men to spend their war
years in prison and far removed from the action,
their chances of achieving this would have been
very slim.

Based upon the cases of repeat offenders such
as Latto or Auger, a natural question which arises
for the researcher is why did repeat offenders
persist in actions which could knowingly result
in a punishment of death? At an 11 per cent rate
of confirmation was the death penalty enforced
enough to be feared? Were soldiers supremely
confident in the suspension of sentences or did
they look at possible imprisonment as a means
of escaping the more dangerous pursuit of front
line duties? According to historians Cathryn
Corns and John Hughes-Wilson, for many
soldiers the decision to desert was based on a
well-calculated set of risks rather than being the
result of momentary fits of panic or intense fear
caused by shell-shock.11 Being fully cognizant
of the possible penalties, many men felt more
comfortable in taking their chances on desertion,
rather than remaining in the front lines. Prison
was seen as a comfortable alternative to trench
warfare. A letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel
Lieutenant-Colonel T.L. Tremblay, commanding officer
of the 22nd Battalion, believed that the death sentence
was an essential tool for discipline, otherwise troops
would desert with the expectation that they would be sent
to prison and avoid the possibility of being killed on the
battlefield.
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Nevertheless, Latto’s sentence was commuted
to 15 years penal servitude. His case does not
stand alone. Thirteen of the commuted cases had
previous charges of AWL or desertion, and of this
number six can be classified as having very poor
disciplinary records, meaning that there was a
previous FGCM conviction for desertion, or more
than four cases of absence.
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Table 1a – Personal Information – Executed Cases

The fact is that the Suspension of Sentences
Act was needed in 1915 as casualties mounted
and as some deserters and repeat offenders
took advantage of the system. As a result the
disciplinary structure was forced to manage
a precarious balancing act which needed to
maintain order, yet also consider practical
manpower needs. The army was not always
successful in juggling these two goals and at
times they made mistakes in distinguishing
between those opportune moments to show
firmness and those moments to show leniency.
However, despite protestations on the part of
some commanders, the problem was not with
the Suspension of Sentences Act itself. The act
was a very practical response to the realities of
the war. The real problem was the inconsistent
application of punishment. The fact that some
chronic deserters were consistently treated

leniently while some first time offenders were
executed left the system open to criticisms both
among contemporaries and historians.
State of the Battalion and
Recommendations from Officers

W

hile desertion and cowardice may have been
individual acts, they were viewed by the
military hierarchy as indicative of poor battalion
discipline. For this reason the state of the
collective behaviour of a battalion was a major
factor when deciding whether a sentence of death
should be confirmed or commuted. Behind every
decision to execute lay the maxim “for the sake
of example” and the question of whether such
an example needed to be made. While it is true
that some divisional commanders pushed for
the application of the death penalty more so than
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Table 1b – Personal Information – Commuted Cases

others, it appears that all levels of command
believed in the deterrent effect of executions.
This intention to reassert discipline in the battalion
repeatedly emerges as one of the most telling
and persuasive points made by commanding
officers charged with reviewing the sentences
of death. For example, in the case of Alexandre
Gaudy of the infamously poorly- disciplined 22nd
Battalion, Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen,
commander of 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade,
wrote that “The crime of desertion from the
trenches has been very prevalent in this Battalion,
and it is considered that unless examples are
immediately made in such cases, that this crime
will continue.”13 Conversely, when it was felt that
a battalion was well-disciplined and that a crime
was not motivated by the overall laxness of the
battalion, these sentiments were also expressed
by commanding officers. Such was the case
in the recommendations found in the court

martial of Private Townsend of the 1st Canadian
Mounted Rifles. As Major-General Louis Lipsett,
commander of the 3rd Canadian Division,
wrote in Townsend’s recommendation for
commutation, “The Discipline in the Brigade is
good, and the Battalion behaved very well during
the Somme Battle; an example is not required.”14
It was statements from men such as Ketchen
and Lipsett which had the most influence on the
decisions of the confirming authorities. These
recommendations were absolutely necessary to
outline the facts of the case, and most importantly
the quality of the individual and the battalion.
Recommendations for sentencing were submitted
up the chain of command. Letters found in those
cases researched came from commanders of the
battalions, the brigades and the divisions. Along
with their recommendations on confirmation of
the sentence, commanding officers were expected
to comment on the accused’s behaviour and
fighting record, whether the crime in question
29
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was committed deliberately, the state of the
battalion and whether an example was needed.
The importance of the recommendations of
commanding officers speaks to a certain degree
of maneuverability within the prescribed British
procedures for courts-martial. Historian Gerard
Oram believes that on the whole there was more
leverage within the British military legal system
than has traditionally understood. He argues that
unit commanders had the means at their disposal
to avoid the use of the death penalty among their
own men.15 In many instances commanders
looked for extenuating circumstances so as to
avoid a recommendation of death. For example,
in the case of Private George Raymond Reed, what
was described by Brigadier-General J.H. Elmsley
as “extreme youth” was taken as an extenuating
circumstance and as a reason to commute
his death sentence. 16 Furthermore, medical
evidence, in particular shell-shock, also became
a consideration in courts-marital. By 1916, the
term shell-shock had become widely known and
used among the men of the CEF. Not only did
claims of shell-shock become more abundant
in the medical tents, but by 1916 shell-shock
also became a much more widely used defence
at courts-martial. Some cases surely warranted
such claims, but many others did not. The reality
was that most of the men were criminals in the
context of CEF discipline, and only a few could
be legitimately categorized as shell-shock victims.
According to The King’s Regulations and Orders
for the Army, an accused person was supposed
to be assessed by a medical officer on each day of
his court martial.17 However, this protocol does
not appear to have been followed. All evidence
indicates that medical reviews were only carried
out when shell-shock was used as a defence or
if testimony emerged indicating that shell-shock
was a contributing factor to an offence. Even in
some cases where these factors were present it
appears that medical exams were never called
for. That said, these courts-martial must be
understood in context. Medical exams were
time consuming for a system of justice meant
to deal with crimes quickly and in the field. The
fact that medical exams were not given for every
individual who faced a court martial does not
indicate gross miscarriages of justice. What is
more problematic is that they were not given
consistently in cases where shell-shock was a

probable factor. The inconsistencies may be
due to the fact that in the First World War shellshock was not understood by medical or military
authorities in the same way that it is today. To
fault members of courts-martial for this would
be to project our own knowledge into the past.
Secondly, the lack of medical exams may have
been due to the individual wills of officers of the
court marital wishing to hurry along the process.
This deliberate disregard for relevant evidence
is far more problematic and leaves the military
judicial system open to modern criticism and
accusations of injustice.
Out of the cases reviewed, three of the executed
men, Privates Eugene Perry, Thomas Moles and
Frederick Arnold, made claims of shell-shock.
It appears that none of these men received a
medical exam, including Arnold, who had been
treated for shell-shock just prior to his offence.
However, incomplete records make it impossible
to confirm this. Arnold was hospitalized for shellshock from 2 January 1916 to 22 May 1916.
Upon discharge from treatment Arnold absented
and was apprehended on 27 June 1916. It is
probable that Arnold’s absence was influenced
by his illness and his fear of returning to the
front lines, yet there was no indication among
his records that Arnold’s illness was taken
into account. There is no proof of a medical
examination to determine Arnold’s state of
mind at the time of his court martial, nor any
other records which suggest that his illness was
considered to be an extenuating circumstance.
Based upon Arnold’s previously clean record and
his treatment for shell-shock, his case stands out
as an almost inconceivable decision to proceed
with execution.
In spite of cases such as Arnold’s, further
research into commuted cases has proven
that at times members of courts-marital did
show genuine concern for a defendant’s mental
state. At these times, shell-shock was used as
a successful defence and the medical evidence
was thoughtfully considered. In the commuted
cases, records show that seven of the twenty-five
men had either suffered previous cases of shellshock, or had claimed that their offence was in
some way triggered by their mental condition.
Out of these seven cases at least three of the men,
Privates Reuben Smith, Harry Townsend and
John Owen, did receive evaluations by an Army
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Captain holding Court Martial (on nervous German Prisoner) by George L. Stampa.

Medical Board. Without complete documentation
it is impossible to know the circumstances of the
other cases. What these commuted cases make
clear is that there was not a callous disregard for
all shell-shock claims, nor a systemic attempt
to target the mentally weak for execution. Not
every soldier was treated judicially by the court
marital system, but nor was every individual
treated unfairly. The reality was much more
nuanced and dependent upon other mitigating
factors regarding the accused, the opinion of
those officers who sat on the court martial, as
well as overall battalion discipline and timing.
Timing

T

he third major factor worth considering
when discussing the fates of those accused
of desertion or cowardice was the timing of the
offence. Both the period and duration of absence
were factors which weighed heavily upon the
decisions of the courts-martial. According to the
findings of Gerard Oram, death sentences were
strongly influenced by the phases of the war.
Oram’s statistics indicate a direct correlation
between an increase in the enforcement of death
sentences and the planning and execution of a

major British offensive. Oram believes that there
are two major reasons for this relationship:
Firstly, desertion increasingly was more prevalent
as zero-hour approached: tensions were no
doubt heightened as the usual preliminary
bombardment intensified. Secondly, the courts
martial may at such times have adopted a
harsher line with alleged deserters, using the
death sentence as a deterrent to prevent any
evasion of front line duties.18

These standards seem to have been maintained
throughout the course of major offensives, only
becoming more relaxed as the battles tapered off.
Certainly timing was an important
consideration when offences and courts-martial
coincided with major offensives. Offensives
influenced the behaviour of the ordinary soldier,
as well as the decisions of high command. For
example, half of the executions for cowardice in
the British Army took place during the Battle of
Somme, a battle which tested the wills of British
soldiers to a previously unfathomable level.19
Furthermore, high command was far more
unlikely to forgive transgressions committed
during major battles which others endured. No
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Table 2a – Court-Martial Information – Executed Cases
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doubt this was an influential factor in the CEF’s
decision to execute Private Edward Fairburn.
Fairburn was absent from April 1917 to January
1918. The absence of ten months indicated to
the court martial a very clear intent to desert,
and an awareness of this intention. Furthermore,
during his period of absence Fairburn had missed
the major offensives at Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and
Passchendaele, an extremely important factor
in the desperate days of 1917.20 Statistics from
the 50 cases researched clearly indicate the
intolerance on the part of command for desertion
committed in the days preceding or during major
allied offensives. Out of the 22 men executed
for desertion in the CEF, three were deserters
from the Somme, four deserted during or just
prior to the advance on Vimy, two men were
deserters from Passchendaele, while three more
deserted during intense operations. Strikingly,
only three men whose sentences were commuted
had deserted during major battles, one from the
Somme and two from Vimy Ridge. This contrast
is one of the most telling features that distinguish
cases in which the death sentence was carried
out from those in which it was commuted.
Larger events in the war also influenced
decisions on the death penalty. In 1917 the
French Army, demoralized by the failed Nivelle
Offensive, fell prey to mutiny. While the French
managed to recover and fight on, the incident
heightened the fears of collapse among British
and Dominion leaders, as they too were losing
men in extraordinary numbers in offensives
which often seemed futile. In 1917 there was
no better instance of these pressures than
Passchendaele. In attempting to force a British
breakthrough in Flanders, the British Forces
launched an attack on 31 July 1917, suffering
a total of 310,000 casualties over the next three
months in exchange for five miles of land. Unable
to admit failure, the British leadership allowed
the battles to continue far into the autumn. For
Canada’s part, in two weeks of fighting from 26
October 1917 to 6 November 1917, the CEF
suffered 16,000 casualties to capture of the
village of Passchendaele.21 As Andrew Godefroy
writes, “The effect on the soldier’s morale can
only be imagined. Passchendaele was slaughter
and incompetence of the leadership, and every
soldier knew it.”22 In an effort to prevent the
demoralizing effects of the battle, and to ward

off dissent, the British leadership looked
to reimpose discipline. Whether executions
proved at all effective in maintaining morale is
highly debatable. It is likely that the executions
were most useful among leaders in convincing
themselves that they were doing all that could be
done in order to maintain the fighting capabilities
under the most disheartening conditions.

Conclusion

I

n a 1922 memorandum entitled, “Some Notes
Regarding the Award and Confirmation of
Sentences of Death on Canadian Soldiers in the
Great War, 1915-1918,” the Chief of the General
Staff wrote:
It can be confidently asserted that no man
suffered the extreme penalty except after a
fair trial and after due consideration had been
given to all extenuating circumstances. This
is certainly true of all cases occurring in the
Canadian Corps and there is no reason whatever
to doubt that it is not equally true of the cases
outside the Corps.23

Based on the research contained in this
article, this statement appears questionable. In
comparing Canadian death sentences confirmed
with those that were commuted, certain patterns
emerge, but so do inconsistencies. While there
is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that any
of the convicted men were innocent of their
crimes, there are a number of cases which
give one cause to question the decisions of the
confirming authorities, as well as their attention
to extenuating circumstances. Most notable
among these cases are the executions of five first
time offenders, especially in light of repeated
commutations of flagrant and habitual offenders.
A comparison of the confirmed and commuted
death sentences has shown that, contrary to
what some historians have led us to believe, the
military judicial system was not black or white,
either fair or unfair. It was often apparently
inconsistent and largely affected by time and
circumstance.
The findings presented here suggest that the
disciplinary record of the convicted man was
often not so important as the state of the battalion
and the timing of a crime in relation to major
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operations. While certainly these factors did not
hold a consistent level of importance in the 50
cases examined, they were nevertheless the most
constant predictors of courts-martial decisions.
The state of the battalion weighed heavily
upon the minds of men like Haig and the
divisional commanders as it spoke to the need
for examples to be set. “For the sake of example”
influenced each court martial decision, and
carried particular weight immediately prior to,
or during, major offensives. For this reason the
timing of the accused’s period of desertion or
act of cowardice was important. To miss a major
engagement proved not only clear intent to the
court martial, but at times was considered to be
an unforgivable transgression.
What is most striking about the decisions
of the courts-martial is that often the actual
facts of a case seemed to have been of
secondary importance. Recommendations from
commanders focused on behaviour prior to an
offence and the state of the battalion, paying
little attention to the actual details of the crime
in question. It was not so much the offence that
was being tried, as it was the individual’s past
and his battalion’s performance in war.
In the interest of making an example bad
choices were sometimes made. Whether a crime
coincided with a major offensive, or at a time
when commanders decided it was necessary to
prove to a rebellious battalion that actions had
consequences, a soldier often found himself at
the mercy of circumstances. Therefore, while
it can be argued that the timing of the offence
and the state of a battalion proved to be the
most important factors differentiating between a
sentence commuted and one confirmed, it should
also be acknowledged that at times pure luck.
To characterize the death sentences of the
First World War as travesty or necessity is not
enough, and certainly not the topic of this article.
This article is meant only as another step in
uncovering the reality of the courts-martial
system examined through a sample of the cases
of commuted death sentences. Perhaps the
greatest injustice which could be done to this
topic is to not acknowledge the complexity of
the courts-marital system and to not realize that
each death sentence represented a unique case

deserving its own study. It is clear that some
leaders made mistakes, some men showed fear,
some men were irresponsible and some injustices
were committed. To acknowledge this is not to
call for pardons, but to confront the past in a
way that promotes deeper understanding. Ninety
years on, the First World War and the trials of
its soldiers is a topic which still fascinates many,
and the executions of our very own is a topic still
searching for reckoning.
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